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Foreword 
Small-scale privatisation (SSP) of shops, restaurants, and other consumer 
services was the first stage of the complex process of privatisation in East-
ern Europe and the Russian Federation. It was a giant social and economic 
experiment to assess the demand for previously state-owned property and 
people's attitudes towards private ownership. It was also an in-depth exam-
ination verifying different techniques of privatisation. Recent experiences of 
SSP in Eastern European countries and the Russian Federation, although 
broadly publicised by the mass media, were barely analysed in a compar-
ative perspective. Since the majority of the former communist economies 
are already undertaking full-scale privatisation, or at least elaborating the 
programs for it, the time has come for the analysis of experiences already 
accumulated during the first stage. 
This paper, prepared under the auspices of the Economic Transition and 
Integration (ETI) Project, is one of the first serious attempts to focus on 
small-scale privatisation from a comparative point of view. The authors, 
members of IIASA's ETI Project, have meticulously documented recent de-
velopments in SSP in the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, former 
Eastern Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Russian Federation. The paper 
examines the characteristics of each stage of the privatisation processes and 
compares them across the nations, beginning with the emergence of the idea 
of SSP, through legislation, and the rise of unexpected tensions during the 
implementation phase. The characteristic features of the newly privatised 
retail and service businesses are also reviewed. 
lll 
Peter E. de J dnosi 
Director 
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Small-scale Privatisation in Eastern Europe and Russia: 
A Historical and Comparative Perspective 
JANOS GA.cs, IL'DAR A. KARIMOV & CHRISTOPH M. SCHNEIDER 
Small-scale privatisation (SSP) is an integral part of the transition to a market 
economy in the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
Russian Federal Republic (RFR or Russia). Throughout these nations a pre-
dominant hope has prevailed that SSP would constitute the fastest, easiest and 
most welcomed part of the complex privatisation process and additionally 
serve as a catalyst for the development of a wide cohort of entrepreneurs. These 
virtues of SSP were expected to be a major contribution to the evolution of 
competition, the unfolding of a market economy and the balancing of the 
hardships the population must endure as a consequence of the crisis accom-
panying the process of transition. 
While small-scale privatisation is still in its infancy in Russia, it is well 
under way or close to completion in the neighbouring former socialist countries 
to the west . . The smaller CEE economies differ in terms of their initial 
conditions, privatisation legislation, techniques employed in SSP, the level of 
public satisfaction with the results of SSP, and other factors. Consequently the 
study of these issues could be beneficial for the advancement of SSP in those 
nations with substantial privatisation still to be undertaken. 
The potential to benefit from and assess the applicability of the experiences 
of CEE countries motivated the Committee for the Management of State 
Property of the RFR to ask IIASA to organise a workshop that leading officials 
from the responsible agencies for SSP from these smaller countries would 
attend. As a result, top officials and experts from the Ministry of Privatisation 
of Poland, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the State Property Agency of 
Hungary, the Ministry of Administration and Privatisation of the Slovak 
Republic, German, Polish and Hungarian economic research institutes, and 
IIASA gathered in Laxenburg in late June 1992. They met with the department 
chiefs from the Committee for the Management of State Property of the RFR 
designated by Anatolii Chubais, Deputy Prime Minister of the RFR and 
Chairman of the Committee. At the meeting the exchange of individual 
nations' experiences in small-scale privatisation, and especially the combina-
tion of leading policy makers with hands-on experience and research scholars 
specialising in background material and analysis of results, helped to achieve a 
balanced perspective on the topics under discussion. 
Dr Janos Gacs, Dr Il'dar A. Karimov & Dr Christoph M. Schneider, International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria. 
62 J. Gries, I. A. Karimov & C. M. Schneider 
The original version of this paper was prepared as background material for 
the meeting. That paper and the accounts of the various national experts and 
ensuing discussions together form the intellectual basis for this up-to-date 
description of SSP in the CEE countries and Russia.* The information we 
collected during this workshop has been complemented with background ma-
terial (see the list of references) and with the information the authors acquired 
on their study trips to Budapest, Moscow, Prague and Warsaw during 1991-92. 
The characteristics at each stage of the privatisation processes were thoroughly 
analysed and compared across the nations, beginning with the emergence of the 
idea of SSP, through legislation and the rise of unexpected tensions during the 
implementation phase, to the particular features of newly privatised retail and 
service businesses. 
Emergence of the Idea of SSP-Principles, Legislation and Techniques of Small-
scale Privatisation 
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
SSP legislation was approved on I October 1990 (The Law on the Transfer of 
State Property and Some Goods to Other Juridicial or Natural Persons). The 
legislation defined small-scale privatisation by two features: the business to be 
privatised would not carry on any obligation of the previous owner (debt, other 
obligations like training apprentices, etc.), and the only method to be used was 
to be the auction. The legislation did not define the maximum value or activity 
of a particular unit to be privatised under SSP. Thus, any type of retail , 
wholesale and even manufacturing enterprise could have been privatised under 
the guidelines of the SSP programme. The largest items sold in the course of 
Czechoslovakian SSP exceeded a value of CSK I 00 million (US$ 3-4 million). 
The auction was seen as the most transparent method for unbiased distribu-
tion . It allowed some adjustment if the original assessment of the value of the 
unit to be privatised turned out to be unrealistic. The auction was also regarded 
as the method that was least open to corruption. 
The ultimate decision power in SSP was in the hands of the Ministry of 
Privatisation. Privatisation commissions were formed in every district ; in 
Slovakia, for instance, there were 38 such districts. Each commission made a 
list of businesses to be auctioned. The municipalities and local governments 
were advising on the inclusion or exclusion of particular businesses. The 
managers of the business were obligated by law to make all the necessary data 
regarding the enterprise available within 30 days. After the lists were discussed 
with the local authorities and branch ministries, the Ministry of Privatisation 
had to give final approval. The commission was responsible for publishing the 
list in the press at least 30 days before the auction. In order to participate in an 
auction, persons were required to pay a refundable fee equivalent to a deposit 
of 10% of the starting price' or CSK 10000 (US$ 300-350). The price 
determined in the auction had to be paid 30 days thereafter. 
During the preparations for the SSP some general principles were followed 
to preclude the emergence of monopolised private retail trade. Giant retail 
trade companies responsible for the supply of whole counties were split up into 
several smaller units, while the wholesale activity of these companies was 
concentrated in one of the new units created from the old company. 
The goal of SSP in the CSFR was not to achieve the highest possible price. 
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The true objective was simply to reduce state o.wnership and to create an 
indigenous business class. This is why legal persons founded in the previous 
socialist system (like state-owned enterprises) were precluded from participat-
ing in the auctions and also foreign (physical or legal) persons were allowed to 
enter only in the second round of auctions, that is, if the first auction for a 
given unit turned out to be unsuccessful. 
Auctions were carried out by independent committees. The auctions were 
divided into two groups depending on the character of the items: 
(I) the whole entity, including land and buildings; and 
(2) enterprises located within the building, that were not the property of 
the building owner. In this case, the inventory and equipment were 
auctioned, not the opportunity to rent. The successful bidder then 
obtained the right to make an agreement with the owner of the 
building for a two-year (extended in October 1991 to an obligatory 
five-year) rental agreement. 
If the auctions were faced by a lack of demand, then the law allowed the 
modification of the auction to the 'Dutch' form, in which the initial (starting) 
price could be successively reduced. In the first round, prices could be reduced 
to 50% of the original price by increments of 10%. In case the first round did 
not result in a sale, a second round followed in which prices could be allowed to 
decline to 20% of the original price. The only limiting condition for a 'Dutch' 
auction was that at least five persons had to take par. in this event. Out of the 
15 000 to 19 000 auctions in the process of SSP, about 1500 had to be 
concluded in the 'Dutch' manner. 
Tradition made it difficult to determine the appropriate method to identify 
the most reasonable starting price. Originally, the depreciated value of build-
ings and equipment was simply used. The distorted pricing system under 
communism rendered this system inadequate. In May 1991 a special decree 
was passed on how to compute the prices of businesses. Two multiplier 
coefficients, based on the original price of buildings and machinery and on the 
year of privatisation (the age), were used. After some months, the coefficients 
were thought to be too low, and they were increased in late 1991. This 
intervention later turned out to be excessive because the computed prices of 
land and buildings were then above the market value, making them difficult to 
sell. 
The revenue from SSP is kept separate from the state budget for anti-
inflationary reasons. In the one and a half years before June 1992, CSK 14 
billion were earned as a result of privatisatiJn. Some of this revenue has been 
used for the privatisation process. 
During the preparation of the privatisation law many employees of enter-
prises to be privatised requested exceptions and special preferences. The 
request for closed rounds of auctions, restricted solely to employee participa-
tion, was one of the most popular among them. As for additional pressure, 
trade unions threatened industrial action and strikes. While the governments 
were divided on the issues, eventually both the majority of the three govern-
ments (the ministers of economic affairs in the Czech, Slovak and Federal 
governments) and the Parliament rejected the granting of any preferences for 
the employees of the units to be privatised as part of the SSP process. 
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Former East Germany 
After World War II, East Germany was still a centre of flourishing private 
enterprise, particularly in retail trade, services and light industry. In 1950 this 
sector employed 42% of the work force and accounted for 31 % of GNP. 
However, by the early 1970s it had, for all intents and purposes, been elimi-
nated. Most of the small and medium sized businesses had been absorbed into 
the oversized administrative, integrated enterprise organisations called Kombi-
nate. In 1989 the private sector produced only 3% of GNP, but was still most 
active in retail trade and services. 
We need not emphasise that the German process of privatisation is a very 
special one. The legislation that was required to facilitate SSP was essentially a 
function of the unification process of the two Germanies in 1990. Firstly, this 
encompassed the monetary union with West Germany and the acceptance of 
the general laws and business practices from West Germany, and secondly, the 
establishment of the trust agency, the Treuhandanstalt. The Treuhand, as it is 
commonly referred to, was actually established by the last communist govern-
ment on I March 1990 as a trust company and was transformed into a state 
holding company to manage and ultimately privatise state property by a 
modification of the earlier law on 17 June 1990. Initially all state property was 
transferred to the Treuhand, which in turn changed the existing enterprises to 
either joint stock companies or limited liability companies. After dealing with 
some complications involving restitution problems, a speedy SSP programme 
was introduced. 
Restitution was a major obstacle for East German privatisation. The process 
was seriously hindered by unresolved problems of restitution until late March 
1991, when the so-called 'Speed-up Law', which modified 11 existing laws, 130 
regulations, and a new law and 62 new regulations were introduced. These new 
regulations made it possible to compensate previous owners with cash rather 
than their original property. 
In the area of the former German Democratic Republic the decisions to put 
property up for auction were made by commissions. These commissions were 
made up of local government personnel, other state officials, and members of 
the Treuhand. The Treuhand dealt with all the property of the 126 giant 
Kombinate (integrated enterprises containing small and medium-sized firms) 
and over 2000 retail enterprises belonging to local authorities. Generally, the 
SSP was undertaken by regional offices of the Treuhand, while only the largest 
units were handled by the head office. 
East German privatisation could actually proceed both from the top down 
and from the bottom up. The latter method was facilitated by the introduction 
of the so-called 'Split-up Law' (division of vertically integrated enterprises into 
profit centres), while the former was operationalised by the establishment of as 
many as 5000 boards of directors consisting mostly of West German managers. 
This process created the units for small-scale as well as large-scale privatisation. 
After privatisation, the Treuhand guarantees loans to new enterprises and 
assists financing through banks. 
Competitive (sealed) bidding campaigns (also referred to as investment 
contests) were organised for shops up to I 00 m2 and restaurants/pubs up to 160 
m2• These competitions were published in regional and inter-regional newspa-
pers only one week before the auction. The purpose was indirectly to restrict 
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access to outsiders. (There were no direct restrictions on foreign or West 
German capital in place.) As a consequence, 80% of the businesses were sold to 
native East Germans. In the service sector, though, many services were simply 
taken over by the communities (i.e. transport, health care, etc.). In the process 
of SSP, the task and obligation to take over the type of activity and maintain 
the existing employees were transferred to the new owner. 
Hungary 
Until the end of the 1980s, retail trade in Hungary was characterised by a 
dominance of large trade networks owned by the state or cooperatives. They 
were in a quasi-monopoly position on the markets for certain product groups or 
in certain regions. In spite of these networks, however, the importance of 
private shops also grew most significantly during the last decade. By 1990 the 
share of private shops had reached 56% in terms of the total number of shops 
and 20% in terms of total retail trade turnover. The number of private trade 
companies also radically increased: by 1988 their number was almost 3000 and 
their share in the total trade turnover was 1.5%. 
On the initiative of the government, a great number of outlets of the large 
trade networks were contracted out or leased to private entrepreneurs from the 
early 1980s onward. This system has several advantages; namely, as a conse-
quence of these entrepreneurs' profit motivation the supply of products in the 
shops and the level of service improved. However, the strange situation 
developed where a growing part of the revenue of the state-owned trade 
networks originated from the rents paid by the entrepreneurs. The centres of 
many of these networks seemed to become sheer parasites, collecting an 
additional rent over that paid to the owners of the premises, the local authori-
ties. The system reached its peak in 1989, when the trade turnover of the leased 
shops (contractual or rented) exceeded the turnover of the shops functioning in 
the traditional manner. 
The inefficiency of this system eventually gave rise to the idea that the 
original companies should be abolished and their assets divided into a number 
of smaller shops, thus enabling potential entrepreneurs to rent the shops 
directly from local authorities. In officially discussing this idea, Hungary in fact 
became the first of the small CEE countries to put SSP on the agenda of 
economic reform. However, for different reasons, Hungary's programme turned 
out to be the least ambitious and the tardiest in the region, both in its 
objectives and its implementation. The reason for this lay partly in the 
substantial and growing private sector in Hungarian retail trade and services by 
1989. The original idea of the SSP led to much controversy in 1989. The major 
argument against it, expressed mostly by managers having a vested interest in 
the old form of state retail networks, was that breaking up the networks would 
put the shops into a defenceless position vis-a-vis their suppliers, the huge state 
industrial enterprises. 
The SSP law was finally adopted in August 1990 and came into force at the 
end of September, and the programme actually started at the end of that year. 
One of the reasons why this SSP law was eventually adopted and called the Pre-
Privatisation Law (indicating the type of privatisation that must precede other 
privatisation programmes) was the recognition by both the government and the 
deputies in parliament that without an urgently needed immediate step for-
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ward, 'wild' or spontaneous privatisation would soon make SSP meaningless. 
As a matter of fact, between summer 1989 and August 1990, in the phase of the 
so-called spontaneous privatisation, several huge trade companies were trans-
formed into limited liability companies and formed joint ventures with foreign 
companies. Many of the managers of these state companies made major efforts 
to arrange a very rapid (complete or partial) transformation of their company 
because they feared that the introduction of SSP would lead to a break-up of 
their original firm. This rush for transformation-based on laws like the 
Company Act, Act on Foreign Investments (both of 1988) and the Transition 
Act ( 1989)-meant that by the time the SSP programme started, a great 
number of shops no longer conformed to the definitions of the SSP Law. In 
fact, many of the most valuable shops had already been sold, and the ensuing 
revenue invested in a way in which it was no longer subject to state jurisdic-
tion. 
The SSP law put the SSP programme under the control of the State Property 
Agency (SP A). This law covered businesses, workshops and consumer services 
already functioning on lease or other contractual basis. 'Small scale' was 
defined by the number of staff, not exceeding 10 in retail trade outlets and 15 
in catering establishments. In the case of the hotel business, consumer services 
and petrol stations, small scale was defined by a limit regarding the turnover of 
the unit. All units were to be sold at auctions: the initial price had to be 
determined by the SPA. The price was the main and only criterion of success in 
the auction. 
The general principle of Hungarian privatisation practice is to sell busi-
nesses for their real values rather than give them away free, even at the expense 
of more rapid privatisation. While this principle has been challenged many 
times in the last few years, modifications of the procedures helped only a little 
in speeding up different programmes of privatisation. One such recent modifi-
cation in SSP, which we will elaborate later, reveals the possibilities for a major 
group of shops to avoid auctioning. There are no conditions in the privatisation 
programme that call for granting preferences to previous tenants or employees 
of the outlet. The only exception occurs in case of equal bidding, when the 
previous tenant and employees enjoy priority. 
In an effort to speed up SSP, Hungarian policy makers decided early that 
claims for full restitution of previous owners would not be entertained. The 
principle of compensation that was accepted by the parliament, much later 
than the SSP law (in the middle of 1991 ), states that previous owners are 
compensated for their nationalised property to a certain extent only and in the 
form of bills of restitution. These bills can be utilised in limited ways, bidding 
for outlets in auctions included. 
In some cases (in the case of food shops, bookshops, etc.), the new owner/ 
tenant had to guarantee that the profile of the shops would be maintained 
for a certain period ohime. In the majority of cases not ownership but only the 
right to rent for 10 years was sold. Outlets covered by the SSP could only be 
sold to Hungarian citizens; foreigners were not permitted to take part in the 
auctions. 
The legislation also permitted retail outlets to be auctioned several times. 
An auction is deemed unsuccessful if the expected value determined by the 
State Property Agency is not reached. In other words, if the reserve price is not 
attained as a result of the bidding process. In such a case, the unit would be re-
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auctioned in a so-called 'simplified auction', to which only the most serious 
bidders are invited. 
Poland 
After 194 7 the communist takeover effectively suppressed and destroyed pri-
vate retail trade and consumer services in Poland. This major event of Polish 
history had reverberations throughout the next 40 years as reflected in the 
waves of centralisation and decentralisation of trade; the last minor decentrali-
sation campaign was initiated in 1981. 
The private sector's share in Polish retail trade, however, started to increase 
substantially only in 1989, before the wave of SSP. This growth was parlly a 
response to liberalisation measures making it possible for citizens to start new 
businesses and partly a reaction to the huge shortages of consumer goods :n 
state shops. The number of retail trade outlets jumped to 72 000 from the 
previous year's 43 000, not to mention the tens of thousands of unregistered 
vendors conducting business in city streets and squares. 
Small-scale privatisation of existing state outlets started in early 1990 and 
gained a momentum in the middle of that year. SSP in Poland has not been 
guided by a single, specific act. Accordingly, in order to understand the pattern 
of events one must refer to several acts, as well as to the major turn in 
macroeconomic control and economic policy initiated in Poland in early 
January 1990. 
Polish SSP refers to those 100 000 businesses, mostly shops and consumer 
services, wholesale and retail trade enterprises, where the founding organ was 
typically the mayor or the municipal council of the locality. The legal status of 
these municipalities was formed by three major events in 1990. First, free local 
elections were conducted on 27 May. Second, on the same day municipalities 
obtained a legal identity and limited financial independence. They were also 
granted property rights over business premises (land, building plots, shops, 
restaurants, flats) as well as those of about 1600 companies. This meant that the 
long-standing agreements between the owner of the space (most frequently the 
community) and the user (one of the several hundred large enterprises) had 
been cancelled. The owner of a building, the local authority, could then 
independently decide and negotiate with potential tenants. The third important 
event was the Act on Local Self-Government adopted in May 1990. This 
completed the formation of an independent local owner capable of initiating 
and controlling a fully decentralised process of SSP. In fact, this is the most 
important characteristic feature of Polish SSP: the extremely decentralised and 
unregulated manner, coupled with a relatively fast pace. 
Two additional laws enhanced the unfolding of the SSP process: the Act on 
Economic Activity (effective early 1989), and the Housing Act (June 1990). 
The first of these two acts granted each citizen the right to set up a business 
without the need to obtain special permits or licenses, while the second 
excluded trade outlets like shops from the special arrangement in which rents 
had been set centrally by the Council of Ministers. 
In addition to this legal framework, the central governm~nt only made 
recommendations on a limited basis to the local authorities in charge of 
privatisation. This lack of central control resulted in a remarkably large 
variation in the methods by which local authorities arranged the privatisation 
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of the outlets they had possessed. Even if some regular patterns have emerged 
in the process of privatising the several tens of thousands of outlets under the 
auspices of the 2700 municipalities (like the overwhelming dominance of lease 
privatisation over outright sale or the rarity of unrestricted auctions), these 
were more the result of implicit legal constraints or social relations than of any 
explicit central regulation or directive. 
Russia 
Russia is a unique nation in many ways. In Russia there is practically no living 
memory of small entrepreneurship as there was in the other CEE economies. 
Private trade was virtually eliminated in Russia a quarter of a century or more 
before it was in the other CEE nations. Correspondingly, central distribution 
has its deepest roots in Russia. One of the greatest obstacles to the implementa-
tion and success of SSP in the RFR is a direct result of the aforementioned 
factors, namely, the psychology of the population. 
The actual process of SSP began in early 1 992, although several occasional 
auctions were registered in various parts of Russia during 1990-91. Since then, 
the process was chiefly motivated, initiated and directed by the central govern-
ment of the Russian Federal Republic (RFR). A number of decrees signed by 
President E'ltsin since November 1991 had facilitated the key breakthrough to 
implementing privatisation procedures. These included: 
• Foundations of the State Programme of Privatisation for the Year 1992; 
• On Commercialisation of Trade; 
• On Commercialisation of Consumer Services; and, 
• On Freedom of Trade. 
In addition, the Supreme Soviet of the RFR had passed the act On Separation 
of State and Municipal Property on 27 December 1991. This decree was 
essential for the reorganisation of trade controlled by large industrial ministries 
and opened the door for regional privatisation committees to begin active 
privatisation. Since then, SSP became fully legitimate and received true legal 
status in Russia and, more importantly, the strong support of central authori-
ties. 
In late 1991 and early 1992 the start of commercialisation2 and the ensuing 
liberalisation of retail trade created an appropriate environment for the begin-
ning of mass SSP. In fact, until as recently as the middle of April 1992, half of 
the retail trade and consumer services outlets in Russia were still not commer-
cialised. In addition to possessing no separate assets, balance sheets or bank 
accounts, these outlets were also not legal entities. 3 At that time, between 40% 
and 60% of all retail trade and services outlets in Russia were still exclusively 
the property of one or other of the large regional trade monopolies. There had 
been 1800 of these vast organisations in Russia, entirely controlling the 
supplies, stocks, distribution, sales, finance and accounting of their retail 
branches. 
Among those outlets already commercialised, most are small and still largely 
depend on their former 'parents' owing to the generally high level of monopoli-
sation of supply, storage and transport networks, not to speak of the inexperi-
ence of personnel and the infancy of banking infrastructures. Nevertheless, 'the 
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ice was broken' and, since then, millions of people have tasted the spirit of 
small entrepreneurship as either consumer or sales staff. 
Mass SSP in Russia officially began on 5 April 1992, when local authorities 
successfully auctioned over 20 cafes, shops and other commercial retail outlets 
at the first regular auction in Nizhny Novgorod.4 The International Finance 
Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank Group, has drawn on 
the lessons of CEE countries in order to design a unique privatisation project in 
Russia's third largest city. Experts from Poland and the CSFR joined the 
international team. The plans were to sell 2500 of the city's retail trade and 
services operations by the end of 1992. 
In an effort to equalise the vast geographical variation in rates and breadth 
of SSP, Russia was divided into 88 regions and a regional privatisation 
committee established in each one. In the initial phase of SSP there had been 
no true links between the central and the 88 regional committees. Following 
unsatisfactory results in the distribution, extent and speed of privatisation, 
which were in part attributed to the lack of active ties between the regional and 
central committees, the former were subsequently directly subordinated to the 
Committee for the Management of State Property of the RFR in Moscow. 
Further reasoning behind this move was that, in Russia today, the central 
government is recognised as more progressive and reform-oriented than 
the local authorities and committees. It is not too surprising that this has 
resulted in a very hierarchical structure, but the Committee has argued that this 
is a necessity to speed up the process and reduce the influence of local 
apparatchiki. 
According to the legislation, starting prices of outlets are set at their book 
value in 1979 prices. As a consequence, and also thanks to the extensive 
investors' interest, selling prices of outlets were many times higher than the 
starting prices. There has so far been no case in which a foreign investor has 
bought outright a retail trade or service enterprise, despite the large number of 
foreign firms leasing hundreds of premises for retail trade, mostly in Moscow 
and St Petersburg. Yet the present leasing agreements of these foreign firms do 
not automatically give them the right to buy the outlets once the leases expire. 
The participation of legal and physical entities from other republics of the 
former Soviet Union has also been very weak, although these people are not yet 
generally considered to be foreigners. 
In Russia SSP is not hindered by claims for restitution, as has been the case 
in most of the smaller CEE nations. In Russia there are no grounds for 
restitution. Previous owners and their descendants died long ago, documenta-
tion was discarded and buildings were ruined. All over the country, only a few 
claims of former owners were registered, but none were even considered in a 
court of law. The legislation does not preserve the rights of former owners. 
On 5 June 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the RFR modified the one year-old 
law On Privatisation of State and Municipal Enterprises in the RFR. As far as 
small-scale privatisation is concerned, auctions have become the predomi-
nantly accepted procedure for the sale of both insolvent and well-functioning 
enterprises. This should effectively put a halt to giving away enterprises to 
employees, which has become an all too popular strategy in several regions. The 
new version of the law also includes a package of anti-monopoly measures: for 
instance, it forbids mergers arid acquisitions in the process of privatisation, as 
well as termination of earlier existing legal entities. The changes have signifi-
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cantly strengthened the legislative power of the Committee for the Management 
of State Property. 
On 11 June 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the RFR accepted the State 
Programme of Privatisation for the Year 1992. This document was issued 
within the framework set out by El'tsin's half-year old decree on the Founda-
tions of the State Programme of Privatisation for the Year 1 992. The pro-
gramme not only confirmed mandatory privatisation of the entire wholesale 
and retail trade and consumer services sector in as short a period as feasible , 
but also included in this list units that currently belong to industrial ministries 
and large state enterprises. 5 
The other important novelty in the programme is that small enterprises with 
less than 200 employees and a book value on 1 January 1992 (in 1979 prices) of 
less than 1 million rubles can only be privatised via the auction method at this 
time. This attaches quantitative criteria to the corresponding article of the 
legislation. While it may seem obscure, the absolute majority of not only retail 
but also wholesale trade outlets satisfy these criteria. 
According to the estimates provided in the programme, the gross revenue 
from privatisation in 1992 (including large-scale privatisation, yet to be started) 
will reach approximately 74 billion rubles, including 15 billion rubles from 
physical entities and 10 billion rubles from foreign investors. The Committee 
for the Management of State Property expects essentially to complete SSP in 
Russia by the middle of 1993. 
According to the State Programme of Privatisation for the Year 1992, the 
following techniques of privatisation are recognised: 
• auctioning of enterprises; 
• investment contest with binding conditions (with mandatory competi-
tive bidding at an auction);6 
• non-commercial investment contest with regulated access;7 
• auctioning of liquidated or insolvent enterprises; 
• buy-out of previously leased property (without competitive bidding); 
and, 
• sale of shares of open joint stock companies. 
In addition to the first technique on the list, which has been the most 
frequently utilised instrument, the other privatisation techniques have also 
begun functioning to a varied extent throughout parts of Russia. Since the 
bankruptcy legislation has not began to work on a full scale, there is not a large 
number of insolvent enterprises on sale yet. An investment contest is techni-
cally very difficult and time-consuming: this explains its relative lack of 
popularity. In contrast, the buy-out of previously leased property is very 
popular since, back in 1990, a large number of retail and even wholesale trade 
enterprises became leased companies. The parties permitted to enter auctions 
and contests are: 
• resident physical entities;8 
• resident legal entities,9 if the government share in their property does 
not exceed 25%; 
• any foreign investors with consent from the local soviet . 
In general, new owners are not- burdened with legal handicaps, but at the same 
time they receive few guaranteed benefits. Only in some special cases, like 
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employee buy-outs, are there some legal privileges for buyers. According to the 
law, the employees are required to pay only 20% of the clearing price immedi-
ately and the rest on a three-year installment basis negotiated by the parties 
upon sale. They also get a 30% reduction in the price of the lease, which is 
deducted from the eventual selling price. 
If auctioned property belonged to local authorities (the most prevalent case), 
almost all proceeds go to the local budget with two exceptions: 4.5% of gross 
receipts are collected by the Committee for the Management of State Property 
and another 10% go to the federal budget. Russian and foreign banks are free to 
finance would-be investors, but they cannot use Central Bank of Russia credits 
for such purposes. 
Progress Report: Major Problems Emerging in the Process of SSP and There-
after 
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 
Privatisation of the retail network began on 1 January 1991. 10 SSP coincided 
with the start of economic deregulation. From the beginning of 1 991 retail 
stores had no central orders to fulfil regarding sales or supplies as directed from 
the state or local governments. Very few of the large state retail enterprises were 
under ministerial jurisdiction by this time, most were under local or regional 
authority. From this point onward, prices, inventories, and sales policies were 
solely the responsibility of the individual retail outlets. 
Originally, the SSP in the CSFR was to be on a grand scale with a fast 
programme of privatisation. Approximately 100 000 to 120 000 units were to 
be privatised in a short period of time, but in the middle of the period assigned 
for the SSP (in October 199 l) the Czech Minister of Privatisation declared that 
no more than 23 000 units would be privatised in the programme. The causes 
of this change were many. A large number of the shops and services establish-
ments could not be offered for SSP owing to the condition requiring them to be 
free of any previous obligations. Many of the shops offered at auctions did not 
tum out to be as attractive for would-be buyers as originally thought. 
Special rules for restitution (full in-kind compensation of previous owners) 
also hampered the sale of many shops: the deadline for claims regarding 
previous property is the end of 1 992 and the highest estimate for the percentage 
of the total number of retail shops to be claimed is 40%. According to the 
principles applied here, restitution had priority over SSP. No entity could be 
singled out for privatisation if there were any hints of restitution claims on 
hand or to be expected. The retail and service outlets that did not find new 
owners as a consequence of SSP (or original owners through restitution) were 
not to remain untouched: these will either be privatised in the framework of the 
large-scale privatisation or will be liquidated. 
Even if the original number of units had to be scaled down, the SSP in 
Czechoslovakia was a relatively fast process. In Slovakia, for instance, over 
85% of the (scaled down) number of units had been privatised by 21 June 1992, 
either via auction (67%) or as part of the restitution programme ( 18%). If 
numerous retail stores under the authority of communities or cities are in-
cluded, the percentage is even higher. At any rate, the SSP process by auction 
was to be completed by 30 June 1992. 
Small-scale privatisation has contributed to and stimulated the emergence 
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of the private sector. The importance of this sector in the whole economy has 
expanded dramatically. In Slovakia the share of private sector sales revenue 
quadrupled during 1991 and reached 46% of total volume in the first quarter of 
1992. Slovakia has gone from having virtually no private sector in 1990 to 
having a full-fledged private sector in retail, services and some manufacturing 
by June I 992. 
The structure of ownership after privatisation appears to be quite widely 
distributed. Many of the new owners consist of former employees who were 
successful in the bidding competitions. This, however, is not the majority. 
Numerous persons previously outside the retail trade and services sectors have 
become new owners. This has been very favourable for the development of the 
private sector and competition because these new people are thought not to 
suffer from the decades of the existing practices in the sector. 
Early in the SSP programme many members of the old nomenklatura and 
enterprise managers attempted purposely to slow the process by not providing 
local privatisation commissions with the required statistical basis needed to 
determine an enterprise's fitness for privatisation. Therefore, guidelines on the 
compulsory provision of enterprise data had to be entrenched in the privatisa-
tion legislation. 
While few have questioned the method of auctions as the most appropriate 
way of privatising small business, the fairness and efficiency of the implementa-
tion have often been the source of controversy. One sensitive question was the 
hidden participation of foreign capital. Many foreign investors did not want to 
wait until the second round of auctions, leaving the best units for those eligible 
for the first round. Instead, they participated in the first round as silent partners 
and thus acquired many units, the number and value of which is still unspeci-
fied. These illegal actions were facilitated by some loose regulations: the buyer 
did not have to explain the origin of the money (many millions or tens of 
millions of CSK) paid for the outlet, nor whether the source was taxed revenue. 
Another point of concern was the practice of 'Dutch' auctions, where the law 
could not prevent collusion between the participants and accordingly many 
such auctions were viewed with suspicion by the public. 
Peaks and troughs quite clearly characterised the prices achieved for outlets 
at auctions in the CSFR over the last 18 months. In the early months, growth in 
prices was low owing to caution on the part of buyers and their unfamiliarity 
with entrepreneurship. Just as prices were rising, a new decree to set higher 
starting prices caused demand to drop. Prices regained momentum, only to be 
suppressed again by quasi-legal actions of corrupt forces and racketeers. Gov-
ernment measures to combat corruption led once again to higher prices, but 
new measures regulating the starting prices caused SSP to slow down and gains 
to decline considerably towards the end of the 12-month period. Selling prices 
were initially 50% to 60% above the starting prices; the average realised selling 
price per outlet being around CSK 1 million. In 75% of the cases only the right 
to rent the outlet was sold, and it was mostly in these cases that selling prices 
were much higher than the starting prices. 
As for the post-privatisation activity of the shops, the first experience 
showed that the supply provided by the privatised units often diverged from 
the standard selection and supply of goods known in the past. This has created 
particular problems in meeting the demand for industrial products where the 
former supply standards are still the norm. The very rapid dismantling of the 
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retail network among many different entrepreneurs has not guaranteed the 
preservation of the distribution system as it was, resulting in a shortage of 
certain goods. On the other hand, the new additions to the selection are usually 
very similar in most non-food retail shops, namely, imported toys, electronics, 
perfumes and other household chemicals, consumers goods, and so forth . 
Another interesting feature of the renewed activity of retail trade has been 
provoked by restrictive macroeconomic policies leading to 40% decline in 
consumer demand. Faced by this critical problem, new dealers eagerly searched 
for products that would secure their level of turnover and found that Western 
imports, no longer limited by quotas, were more appropriate than products 
produced domestically. As a consequence, the decline in domestic industrial 
activity is partially blamed on the purchasing policy of newly privatised retail 
trade units. 
Former East Germany 
Privatisation of retail trade and consumer services in the former German 
Democratic Republic was among the most rapid in CEE countries. The process 
of SSP started shortly after the establishment of the monetary union with West 
Germany, midway through 1990. Like in other East European nations, privati-
sation coincided with general economic reform. 
In the year and a half between I January 1990 and 30 June 1991 the 
Treuhand had privatised almost 85% of the retail trade and service outlets in 
its SSP programme. By the end of 1991 most of the previously state-owned 
operations in trade and consumer services had been privatised. Statistical data 
on the privatisation of former HO (state) retail shops, restaurants and hotels 
provide evidence of the dynamics of the privatisation process. Out of the 
30 000 units to be privatised, 9300 were privatised by October 1990 and 
another 14 000 by the end of June 1991. In this second period, two rounds of 
competitive bidding were organised: the first resulting in the sale of some 
11 400, and the second about 2600 outlets. The privatisation of 60% of the 
outlets was organised by branch offices of the Treuhand, while the rest was 
arranged by the head office in Berlin. 
The East German case showed that the centrally planned wholesale sector of 
the old communist days had no future in a privatised retail trade and service 
economy. In fact, in its previous form, this sector became totally useless and 
was completely unprepared to function as a modern distribution system. The 
Germans had two answers; firstly, privatise retail and wholesale essentially 
simultaneously; and secondly, allow Western wholesalers (primarily West Ger-
man in this case) to enter the market. 
Complete opening of the economy to the West, the breakdown of traditional 
markets, the inadequate establishment of a mature entrepreneurial environ-
ment, and the deficiency of managerial experience to exploit the potential of 
the re-privatised sector lead to changes in economic structure that were not 
always beneficial. These factors , combined with a lack of skills in marketing, 
purchasing, controlling, finance and technology and capital transfers have led to 
a sort of colonisation of the most interesting and economically profitable 
activity in the East by the West. 
Retail trade was considered an important sector by Western investors. 
Therefore, the West German retail trade chains were eager to secure shops in 
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East Germany. The Spar chain bought 2000 outlets, Edeka 100, Rewe 200 and 
Engle 413, while other Western retailers preferred green field investments (i.e. 
those required to build a completely new establishment from scratch). 11 As a 
result of this avalanche of Western investment , the concentration of retail trade 
in East Germany still remained very high , certainly higher than in the western 
part of the country. 
The Treuhand followed a policy of encouraging managers of shops under 
100 m2 to buy out their businesses. As a result , 36% of all management buy-
outs took place in the trade and service sector. Experts predict , however, that a 
lack of proficiency and financial power on the part of the new owners may force 
these shops to close soon in the face of competition from the powerful , giant 
chains. These financially solid and aggressive firms show an active investment 
policy in the new provinces and use every tool (like the way the infrastructure is 
reconstructed) to reshape consumer purchasing habits. A characteristic example 
is the construction of big supermarkets and department stores along the 
highway surrounding Berlin. 
In addition to management buy-outs, another method of takeover of small 
and medium-size businesses by East German businessmen was the re-privatisa-
tion of those 4000 firms that had been nationalised by the East German state in 
1972. Unfortunately, the process of re-privatisation did not gain much momen-
tum in the past year and a half; only 25% to 30% of these enterprises could be 
taken back by their original owners owing to the often extensive alterations in 
the business premises and the profile of activity. 
The third manner in which private initiative could gain ground in the small-
scale sector of East Germany was with the growth of new small businesses in 
retail trade and catering. The initiative to establish new businesses was espe-
cially pervasive in 1991; however, by the middle of 1992 a certain balance had 
been achieved between business openings and closures, the former still being 
twice as high as the latter. Statistics also indicate that, as a rule, half of all 
openings and closures take place in the retail trade and catering sector with the 
monthly openings averaging around 8,000 business units. 
Hungary 
Owing to the high initial level of private ownership in retail trade and 
consumer services, the Hungarian SSP was not envisaged as a programme for a 
very large number of units, but only for some 10 000. SSP was conceived as a 
catalyst for the progress of ensuing large-scale privatisation. Neither the experts 
nor the public took long to realise that the dimensions of the programme were 
much smaller than had been originally declared and the implementation was 
extremely slow. 
It turned out that of the I 0 000-10 300 outlets that were originally selected 
for pre-privatisation, a great number were in cooperative or private ownership 
and accordingly not subject to the SSP law. Another 4700 operated on leasing 
or other contractual arrangements where the contract made it impossible to 
privatise the outlet before the expiration of the contract. 12 By April 1992 the 
property rights of only 680 outlets had been sold, while the right to rent had 
been sold in the case of another 1980. There were 560 additional shops where a 
form of privatisation other than auction was applied (for instance, by convert-
ing or merging into a company). As many as 43% of the auctions were 
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unsuccessful and had to be repeated. The average sale price was about 140% of 
the starting price. The revenue from SSP, which reached approximately 8 
billion forints (I 0 billion by August 1992), was to be used primarily to finance 
past and current national budget deficits as well as the costs of privatisation. 
The Hungarian SSP process was also contaminated by some circles that 
attempted to manipulate auctions, particularly if the starting price was per-
ceived to be too high. This caused va1iations in selling prices. However, the 
implementation of the simplified auction under the SSP law facilitated an 
official reduction of the starting price. Consternation that others could subse-
quently afford the particular outlet forced the potential manipulators to bid 
more seriously in the first round in response to this disciplining mechanism. 
While the eventual number of shops offered for SSP turned out to be low, 
the number of unsuccessful auctions was relatively high. This lack of interest on 
the part of Hungarian would-be entrepreneurs could be explained by two 
factors. The first is that too few outlets were offered for outright sale and in too 
many cases only the right to rent the premises was auctioned. Hungarian 
citizens were reluctant to bid for the latter, because there was no regulation 
guaranteeing them an acceptable rent in the medium term in their negotiations 
with the owners, mostly the local authorities. These authorities usually forced 
the new tenants to take new contracts stipulating a higher, often two or three 
times higher, rent than previously paid by the state-owned shop in the same 
location. The other factor was the lack of preferential credits to be used in the 
SSP. In summer 1990 the government promised to provide a so-called Exis-
tence Credit for this purpose, but the Ministry of Finance and the banking 
system took almost a year and a half to elaborate the precise conditions of this 
credit. 
Owing to the obstacles mentioned above, the new Hungarian entrepreneu-
rial class habitually found it more rational and less expensive to start a business 
from scratch rather than buy an existing one via the SSP programme. By the 
end of 1991 about 150 000 private retail traders were registered (half of them 
emerged in 1991 ), as opposed to the 3000 outlets sold in the framework of the 
SSP. Unfortunately, this turn away from existing premises has begun to reduce 
the average level of quality, selection and service offered by these frequently 
single-person enterprises because their location and facilities are often inferior 
to those of the existing shops. 
In any case SSP played a limited role in transforming the Hungarian retail 
trade sector. In the privatisation of the existing retail trade, the selling of large 
trade networks in one piece (not under the SSP programme), played a larger 
role. The 3000 outlets which were privatised in SSP constituted less than 12% 
of the existing state outlets in 1988. 
One of the major controversies concerning the privatisation of Hungarian 
retail trade was whether large retail trade chains should be privatised in one 
piece-in the framework of invited or advertised bidding, through negotiations 
with the SPA-or by units within the framework of the pre-privatisation 
programme. As mentioned above, many networks had already made themselves 
inaccessible for SSP by steps undertaken in the phase of spontaneous privatisa-
tion (for instance by transformation to joint ventures with foreign participa-
tion). Additionally, the SPA's insistence on achieving the highest revenue from 
privatisation meant that mahy networks of specialised retail trade outlets, 
department stores and hotels offered for sale in one piece were extremely 
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costly; consequently, most were sold to foreign investors. On the whole, such 
networks as a single piece usually proved too expensive for domestic buyers. 
Newly privatised retail trade businesses in Hungary had to face a market 
full of new difficulties on the one hand, and a market showing certain signs of 
improvement on the other. In the past two years, restrictive government 
macroeconomic policies caused consumer demand to decline by an annual 
15%. Retail trade had to cope with a massive shrinkage of the market. 
Simultaneously, however, the access of the trade sector to products in high 
demand improved dramatically. The cause of this was partly the progress of 
import liberalisation and partly sales problems of Hungarian producers in 
Eastern Europe. Upon losing their potential markets in Eastern Europe, these 
producers were forced to court domestic retail traders in order to persuade 
them to select their products for sale. This turn of events helped retailers to 
attain a more balanced position vis-a-vis the wholesale enterprises. 13 
The short-term experience with retail chains taken over by foreign investors 
is not unambiguously favourable. Some of the new owners did not modify the 
supply or service of the old shops, but just changed the name of the network 
and adjusted the prices upwards. Others introduced a selection of up-market 
products which masses of Hungarian consumers, suffering from the effects of 
current recession, could not afford to buy. A number of the new owners of these 
networks showed a surprising insensitivity to the actual demand of Hungarian 
consumers. They seemed to be less interested in making money in their new 
business and more satisfied with having gained control over valuable premises 
on the best sites in the Hungarian capital and other major centres. 
As for the quantitative description of the behaviou:;- of new privatised small-
scale retail trade businesses, we may summarise here some findings of a recent 
survey conducted by the KOPINT-DATORG Institute in Budapest. 14 The 
owners/tenants of newly privatised units displayed quite dynamic activity. More 
than 57% of the respondents made investments in their shop and more than 50% 
planned to undertake significant changes (investments) in the near future. 
Almost one-third of the new owners/tenants changed the profile of the shop: 57% 
of them broadened the profile while only a very few narrowed it. About two-
thirds of the entrepreneurs bought their outlet using credit. The 300 respondents 
to the survey on the progress of SSP raised loans from 14 different banks. 
The majority of the new owners/tenants use standard suppliers, mostly the 
traditional, state-owned wholesale trade companies. This seems to be a special 
feature of the pre-privatised small shops since, in the other sectors of retail 
trade, experience shows that a growing number of the firms try to bypass 
wholesale traders and purchase directly from producers or from importers. 
About half of the respondents revealed that the newly privatised shop was 
not his/her first venture, and 40% of them st~ll operate one or more additional 
businesses. This feature indicates that those who participated in the SSP were 
not without previous experience; the great majority of them joined the entre-
preneurial sector during the 1980s. In fact, to buy a shop in Hungary for some 
million Hungarian forints (even with credit) is a risky venture and it would 
have been even more risky for people with absolutely no previous experience. 
Poland 
After the election of new municipal authorities, these new administrative 
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bodies embarked on a vigorous campaign of privatisation of the outlets under 
their control. The Polish population has been identified as always having 
sufficient funds at their disposal to start small businesses. Also, tax holidays 
were granted for small businesses during this time. As a result, municipalities 
saw a chance to gain much revenue by a fast privatisation of retail trade outlets 
in the face of strong demand. 
Owing to a deficiency of detailed regulations other than some general 
guidelines from the central government, the municipal authorities were permit-
ted to devise their own rules of behaviour for this purpose independently. The 
outcome was a variety of methods for allocating rental contracts for the 
premises. 
The outright sale of retail premises was perceived as less favourable under 
the existing conditions. The legal status of the outlets was too obscure for a full 
transfer of property rights. Yet, even if this could have been solved, the 
municipalities themselves preferred a continuing flow of budgetary revenue 
rather than a lump-sum payment for a sale, and also preferred the maintenance 
of their power as owners and administrators preserved under rental agree-
ments. Even a modification in the civil code in October 1990 to facilitate the 
outright sale of various kinds of premises did not lead to a substantial rise in 
outright sales: only 3% of the units privatised were actually sold by the end of 
1991 , while the remainder were rented. 
The methods of allocating the rental contracts varied from the more 
administrative, but unclear approach to the less discriminatory, most transpar-
ent market technique. Some authorities opted for a practice whereby contracts 
were drawn up with previous employees or agents who had had a relationship 
with the earlier business operation of the outlet (i.e. with insiders), excluding all 
other parties, and agreed on a notional, low fee for the lease. Others organised 
tenders but for a restricted group of possible buyers only. Another group of 
authorities preferred the open advertisement of auctions for everybody, and 
either gave preferential treatment to insiders or granted equal treatment to 
anyone expressing interest. The variety of the methods used by municipalities 
is well reflected in the fact that the employees of retail outlets were treated 
differently in different districts of the same city, as was the case in Warsaw. 
Despite the great variety of methods, privatisation was biased towards 
administrative allocation of rental rights versus allocation through the market. 
While in Czechoslovakia and Hungary the application of open auctions was a 
rule, in Poland they were exceptions. Out of the 43 000 rental agreements 
concluded within the framework of SSP, only 4% were completed through 
unrestricted, open auctions by June 1991 . 
Municipalities showed a clear preference for insiders in the allocation of 
rental agreements. This bias has been achieved partly by various forms of 
pressure from groups of insiders: they demanded favourable treatment and 
low fees for leases; they were extremely well organised and supported by trade 
unions. Administrative allocation favouring insiders also resulted in lease fees 
that were usually much lower than the fees achieved through open auctions (the 
latter were 10 to 100 times higher than the former). This fact explains why 
closed allocation of leases was so vulnerable to corruption and other negative 
aspects. 
Municipalities were not regulated by prescriptions from the centre. How-
ever, as a consequence of their similar thinking and vested interests, they 
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tended to issue similar resolutions concerning SSP. For instance, many munici-
palities imposed two conditions on the insiders with whom they intended to 
make a contract. First, the insiders had to form a partnership or limited 
liability company comprising all the existing employees or at least 50% of them 
and, second, insiders applying for the rental agreement had to be employees in 
the given outlet for a predetermined period of time (this latter condition served 
to exclude influential outsiders, like old nomenklatura members, from the 
preferences granted to insiders). 
While the new municipalities were totally unprepared for the tasks required 
for the organisation of the SSP, and undoubtedly made errors and even 
transgressions, the pace of SSP in Poland reached a remarkable rate. Different 
sources show different results: Grosfeld & Hare ( 1991) as well as Dabrowski 
( 1991) estimate that 40% to 50% of all shops were privatised by the end of 
1990, while the Polish Ministry of Privatisation ( 1991) put this ratio at 80%. 
According to government estimates made in September 1991 , private retail 
trade turnover amounted to 72% of the turnover of the whole retail trade 
sector. 15 
Statistical data, however, indicate another interesting feature of the privati-
sation process in Poland. In the year 1990 the number of retail trade outlets in 
Poland increased from 72 000 to 346 000. This explosion of private activity 
clearly cannot be explained only by the privatisation of the 30 000 to 50 000 
outlets previously owned by the state. We should recall a similar characteristic 
feature in the case of Hungary: the establishment of new businesses from 
scratch was more frequent than the conversion of previous state-owned outlets 
and played an equally important, if not dominant, role in the privatisation of 
economic activity. 
Public acceptance of SSP was mixed, but reaction was generally positive. 
Clearly the ownership changes in tens of thousands of retail outlets contributed 
substantially to the secular shift in the supply of goods and services in Poland, 
quickly changing the appearance of towns and the perceived quality of every-
day life. However, the implementation of the SSP also raised doubts and 
caused frustration among the population. The imprecise rules for the imple-
mentation of the process, the absence of clear, unified methods of valuation, 
the inadequate distribution of the information concerning the rules governing 
privatisation and preferences for insiders all generated tensions and conflicts. 
Public discontent emerged both when artificially low rents were agreed with 
selected partners in close negotiations and when exorbitant rents were secured 
in some open auctions for premises in high demand. Among the ambiguities of 
the legal framework one must also mention the problem of restitution which , 
unlike in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, has not been seriously 
tackled in Poland. 
When the privatisation programme for retail trade began, major questions 
arose concerning the state of wholesale trade, as it was still highly monopolised 
in 1990. The retailers had their difficulties with the big state enterprises 
dominating distribution and wholesaling. The transformation of the ownership 
pattern in this field remains ambiguous. State wholesale companies lost one-
fifth of their warehouse space in 1 990, most probably through privatisation. 
Private entrepreneurs also showed vigour in setting up new wholesale busi-
nesses: by the end of 1990 about 35 000 private businesses were registered as 
wholesalers or mixed retailers and wholesalers. The government also tried to 
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challenge the dominance of state wholesale companies by the liberalisation of 
imports and establishing freedom to set up importing businesses. The wholesale 
sector, however, has essentially stayed in the hands of state companies. The 
main cause was the plan to privatise distribution and wholesale enterprises as 
part of the large-scale privatisation scheme, which made Jess progress in the 
first years of privatisation. 
Russia 
The progress of the SSP process has been extremely unevenly distributed in 
Russia, with some regions far along the path and others not even ready to begin 
the process.16 During the early stages, SSP has been primarily concentrated in 
large cities. Moscow has taken the lead; however, some experts allege that this 
can largely be ascribed to the extremely flexible application of SSP guidelines, 
with independent modifications when so desired. Small outlets are not being 
auctioned, but rather given away to their workers or employeees (actually, sold 
at a non-market determined price of I 000 rubles per square metre of total 
space), preserving monopoly-style operation and leaving the property largely in 
the hands of the former nomenklatura. Of the 6000 shops privatised in 
Moscow, 70% were disposed of in this manner. 
The Moscow give-away style of privatisation has been said to encourage the 
criminal factor. Much capital is supposedly flowing in from the grey economy 
and is subsequently often behind employee acquisitions. As a result, the SSP 
has lost some credibility and the receipts from privatisation have not been as 
high as they could under more virtuous circumstances. 
Despite its clear advantage in facilitating a high speed of privatisation, this 
practice leads to preservation of the previous highly monopolised and corrupt 
system of retail trade in Moscow. Personnel remaining from the previous 
system, with their old connections to the upstream monopolies, good level of 
social security, and historically high incomes (in kind and in cash terms), are 
confronted with insufficient incentives to develop their businesses. At the same 
time, the process of creating new small enterprises is much Jess successful in 
Moscow owing to the significant level of corruption among local authorities. 
The way privatisation has been accomplished in Nizhny reveals a more 
promising alternative to the Moscow-type privatisation. The weekly auctions in 
Nizhny have proved to be the most frequented (by sellers and buyers) and the 
most representative in Russia. By 15 June 1992 12 auctions had been held at 
which 120 outlets had been sold. Although these numbers still appear modest, 
they are increasing rapidly and, more importantly, expanding geographically. 
The special feature of the auctions in Nizhny is that what has been sold in 
90% of the cases has not been the outlets themselves but the rights to lease 
them for five years with additional rights to buy them at an estimated value 
after the lease is terminated (by 12 June only IO units had been sold outright). 
This arrangement was the result of technical reasons: land is not yet the subject 
of ownership and almost all outlets are located in the ground-floors of bigger 
buildings, the owners of which are yet to be identified. However, in some other 
cities, local authorities have managed to solve this problem in some fashion , 
significantly increasing auction receipts: for instance, in Belgorod two auctions 
with outright sale were held with an average price of 20 million rubles per 
grocery store-that is five to seven times as much as in Nizhny. 
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As mentioned above, early in 1992 a hierarchical structure of privatisation 
administration had been set up. In May this new structure was put into 
operation and a combination of administrative and economic measures was 
implemented via the hierarchical decision-making process. The response over 
just the next 30 days was a tripling of the rate of privatisation. While earlier the 
number of privatised shops was a mere 55, it rose to 800 by mid June. Of 
course, 800 is still a very small proportion of the 150 000 retail shops, 70 000 
canteens and cafes, and 30 000 consumer services outlets owned by the state 
throughout the country. Most have been well integrated into the large adminis-
trative organisations of the city and local administrations. They are a part of 
the bureaucratic apparatus and are monopolies with respect to activity and/or 
location. These figures however, do not include the 25% of retail and service 
outlets that have traditionally belonged to large vertically integrated industrial 
enterprises, which were originally to supply workers in the enterprises. 
As far as prices of the privatised outlets are concerned, they were on average 
50 to 100 times the original book value (also the starting price at the auction) of 
the premises in N izhny. The initial surge of interest, reflected by the high prices 
offered by prospective buyers throughout Russia, was followed by what ap-
peared to be a drop in demand for the privatised units if the trend of selling 
prices is used as an indicator. In April 1992 the average selling price was 30 
times the starting price at the auction, in May it dropped to 25 times, and by 
June the difference had declined to seven times or less. This phenomenon was 
not unknown in some CEE economies, and was generally a function of capital 
availability, expectations, modifications in the regulations, and corruption. 
Throughout Russia, receipts from SSP have grown by a factor of 30 over the 
three months to June 1992. The buyers, primarily from Nizhny's recently 
emerging commercial sector, have the required 3-5 million rubles readily 
available to purchase the right to five-year leases of grocery stores, barber's 
shops or canteens, most of them without binding conditions on the future 
business profile. (According to guidelines set by the Committee for the Manage-
ment of State Property, not more than 40% of the units can be sold on such 
conditions in urban areas.) Employed personnel of outlets for auction have 
played an important role in the bidding process. For example, 10 out of the 22 
units auctioned on 4 April in Nizhny were bought by their employees. As 
mentioned above, the interest of 'internal' investors was encouraged by signifi-
cant advantages. 
The first effects of commercialisation and privatisation of small-scale busi-
nesses have already become evident: queues have almost disappeared. None-
theless, people are still running around trying to identify 'the true market 
price'. Equalisation of prices is said to be just a question of time. However, the 
problem of supply response has not yet been solved. Most of the upstream 
industries enjoy a monopoly position and still rely on government subsidies 
and cheap credits. 
More important are the social implications of the privatisation programme. 
Workers in retail trade and services-once a mighty and spoiled group-
became as unprotected as everyone else. Local authorities lost their access to 
cheap subsidised goods: old apparatchiki, like the previously privileged retail 
trade workers, are also not pleased with the reform. 17 The regional population, 
in general, does not oppose the SSP; few protests were reported. In Nizhny, 
every auction is accompanied by a few pickets of trade workers, retired staff, 
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and the so-called 'patriots'. In general, the reform is going well, although, 
unfortunately, two privatisation-related murders were reported in Moscow. But 
this is still not comparable with the violence which accompanied the reverse 
process in 1917 and after. 
New owners of retail outlets try to shape their own business policy to fight 
the consequences of declining consumer demand caused by the current tighten-
ing of monetary policy. As a consequence, many of the privatised stores do not 
sell staples, but rather opt for luxury products that are also out of the average 
person's price range. Consumers often associate privatisation with price rises 
that are generally beyond their financial means, particularly if they are pension-
ers or the poor. So, owing to changes in business profiles and price increases 
(though they are really a function of the abolition of subsidies), privatisation is 
often related to the introduction of difficulties into life, and not solely advan-
tages. This influences the psychology towards privatisation, and its acceptance 
by consumers. 
There are a few general problems facing Russian central and local authori-
ties in the process of the SSP. The following is an account of the most 
important issues at present. 
Ownership of premises. In a number industrial cities, retail outlets' premises are 
not just public but rather belong (up to 90% in some areas) to large industrial 
enterprises18 which, already in the process of commercialisation, impede the 
privatisation of outlets. The enterprises are unwilling to give up the outlets, 
because they would not be able to control the supply of consumer goods for 
their personnel and, no less important, they would lose effective potential 
sources of revenue. 
Another problem with respect to ownership is characteristic of outlets that 
have been sold to groups of employees. As the experience of the majority of 
shops privatised in Moscow shows, the behaviour of these units has not 
changed much because a collective of old employees does not have the impres-
sion of truly being owners. Their shop is at the end of the still monopolised 
chain of state goods distribution and no individual employee is permitted to do 
what he/she likes with his or her individual share in the shop. 19 The true feeling 
of ownership is only felt once one has such freedom. Thus, there has been little 
or no change in the quality and selection of goods and services in these shops. 
In contrast, the sale of retail trade or services outlets to new owners resulted in 
a completely different picture, featuring wider selection, polite service, more 
modern sales style, and the feeling that people like to work and work well. 
Remnants of central planning. Retail trade outlets now being commercialised 
and privatised still lack working capital, distribution and transport infrastruc-
ture, logistics, raw materials and other goods supply, and storage facilities. 
These all belong to their former 'parents', the great regional monopolies of 
retailing-the so-called torgi. 
In 1990 as many as 30% of these torgi signed agreements with the former 
Soviet Ministry of Trade (which has successors now) to lease their property, 
with additional rights to buy it when the leases expire. Only the court is able to 
dissolve those agreements, and .only in case of serious infringments. If torgi do 
not violate their agreements, small shops will continue to lack adequate access 
to working capital, transport and storage facilities. This problem impedes the 
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separation of potential objects for SSP. Many facilities that have broken away 
from the torgi empires have preserved their monopoly status regionally and 
inter-regionally. Thus the problem is not simply solved by breaking up the great 
monopolies. 
Loss-making trade and services in remote rural areas. Much of the trade and, 
especially, services in remote rural regions was historically substantially subsi-
dised for an extended period of time. Now, under commercialisation, they have 
difficulty just to survive. Although economically it is inefficient, socially it is 
necessary to maintain them for a long time. Without infrastructure, rural areas 
will further deteriorate. 
High degree of monopolisation of wholesale trade. For more than seven decades 
Russia has had a unified, centralised system of storage facilities upon which the 
retail shops were totally dependent. The lack of an adequate infrastructure on 
the supply side of the privatised retail trade and service outlets causes problems 
for the entire process. The viability of the single units is questionable and their 
operation risky. In a number of regions, successful privatisation of small retail 
outlets without accompanying privatisation of wholesale networks is leading to 
a paralysis of retail trade and consumer services. The newly privatised shops 
are required to find storage facilities, transport, suppliers and so on by them-
selves; something quite new for someone growing up under central distribution 
systems. Again, back in 1990 100% of wholesale networks signed agreements 
with the former Soviet Ministry of Trade to lease their property, with addi-
tional rights to buy after leasing agreements expire-agreements which only the 
courts can dissolve. 
Vague property rights and bureaucratic procedures. Russian SSP, and especially 
the potential participation of outsiders, is also still troubled by immature 
property rights legislation and the complete lack of a state programme support-
ing small entrepreneurship. For most business activities no licence is required, 
but the new entrepreneur must get approval for his or her business profile from 
his or her future competitors-the still state-owned monopolies. Also, the 
documents required for opening a small business are substantial in number and 
the process is quite onerous, though not necessarily complex. 
Current decline in demand for outlets offered for auction. The most recent 
tendency, along with a rapidly growing number of units sold, is a sharp decline 
in selling prices and the contraction of demand in general.2° This fact is 
attributed to the tightening of monetary policy by the Central Bank of Russia in 
the second quarter of 1 992. 
The recent decline in demand in the auctions for outlets is likely to be 
reversed with the introduction of personal privatisation accounts and vouchers 
that was expected towards the end of 1992. (These vouchers were to be 
introduced by I November 1992) The other problems can hardly be solved 
within the next few months or even years. There are some elegant solutions; for 
instance, transformation of torgi into joint stock companies which belong to 
their former subsidiaries-the retail trade outlets. 21 But these solutions require 
a consensus of all parties involved and, not least, plenty of time. 
Small-scale Privatisation 83 
Conclusions 
Small-scale privatisation in the past four years has contributed to and stimu-
lated the emergence of the private sector in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Russia. The importance of this sector in the whole economy has expanded 
dramatically. The share of private sector sales revenue has increased substan-
tially and most of the countries have gone from having virtually no private 
sector ten or less years ago to having a full-fledged private sector in retail trade, 
services and some manufacturing by June 1992. 
In most countries of the region the privatisation of state property acted as a 
catalyst in the stimulation of new business, while in some countries, like 
Hungary and Poland, earlier deregulation and longer traditions rendered the 
privatisation of existing state-owned outlets less important and the establish-
ment of new businesses more significant. SSP has also been responsible for 
altering the population's perspective and psychological disposition to the merits 
of private initiative. 
In addition, the quality of goods and service, the general level of selection, 
including imported products, as well as the presentation and style of sale have 
all greatly improved. Partly thanks to effective macroeconomic policies and 
partly thanks to a more responsive retail trade sector, queues have disappeared 
and there is more to buy than people can afford. Everything from opening 
hours to advertising have seen significant changes. The number of shops has 
increased dramatically, convenience has improved in many ways, and competi-
tion has been ignited among domestic retailers and service people. There is 
hope that this may reverberate all the way through the up-stream supply 
channels. The populations are becoming educated about the functions (the 
advantages and disadvantages) of a market economy. 
Some progress has been achieved in establishing and developing an entre-
preneurial class, as well as in the creation of the infrastructure necessary to 
support SSP and the subsequent operation of these new enterprises. Business 
has become much freer relative to the past, though it is not always easy to 
become an entrepreneur and operate a retail or service outlet in the private 
sector. Nevertheless, the establishment of a background of institutional support 
is lagging well behind the growth of privatised business. This feature is partly 
responsible for the hardships newly privatised businesses must endure when 
they start operation and for the failure of some new businesses. 
The progress of the financial sector, including the infrastructure of banks 
and credit institutions, is of crucial importance for further development of the 
small-scale sector. Without massive credit lines on favourable conditions, the 
majority of the new entrepreneurs may have to close their new venture before 
their ability to conduct business has been proven one way or the other. Another 
useful form of support, unfortunately not very often utilised, is a system of tax 
breaks and investment incentives for new entrepreneurs. 
Some SSP programmes, or their implementation, have shown a clear prefe-
rence for former employees and/or managers of the outlets targeted for privati-
sation (Poland, former East Germany and Russia), while others (like those of 
the CSFR and Hungary) secured equal opportunities for outsiders (that is, non-
employees). The clear and across the board preference for the previous employ-
ees appears to be disadvantageous. If the workers receive the outlet virtually 
free, there will be too little incentive to restructure the business and rationalise 
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staffing under economic conditions characteristic of the transition to a market 
economy. However, if buying the outlet is a substantial investment for them, 
then the arrangement carries a high risk, since they put all their savings and 
earnings into one enterprise, if they have such savings. In other cases, the lack 
of capital impedes the acquisition of potential enterprises. 
A characteristic and common feature of SSP in each country is the prefe-
rence for domestic investors, or even the exclusion of foreign ones. In countries 
embarking on a prolonged process of privatising a dominant share of state-
owned business, it is justifiable to secure prospective indigenous entrepreneurs 
(lacking the necessary capital to compete with foreign bidders) a fair opportu-
nity for access to small-scale businesses. Each country has made provisions to 
limit foreign involvement. However, no such provisions can be complete. The 
Czechs, for example, are seriously concerned; despite the exclusion of for-
eigners from the first wave of auctions for retail trade outlets, a major part of 
this sector is now owned by Germans. In Hungary, the exclusion of foreigners 
from bidding for 3000 privatised outlets means nothing compared to the more 
than 100 000 other outlets they can buy either one by one or in the form of 
networks. 
As for the speed of SSP, we have seen very swift programmes (CSFR and 
Poland) and a slow one (Hungary). The German case, where it was also rapid, 
must be considered in the context of its peculiarity (the involvement of West 
German capital) and the speed of Russian SSP cannot yet be measured. Rapid 
privatisation has its obvious advantages: a quick transition from coordination 
by central planning to trade without any inefficient transitional method of 
coordination and the avoidance of the detrimental effects of spontaneous 
privatisation, or decapitalisation. One should be aware of the fact, however, 
that the faster the SSP process is, the more complaints can be expected about 
loss of privatisation revenue, unclear bidding procedures and corruption. 
A SSP programme organised in a short period of time does not guarantee 
completion of the privatisation process. Guidelines and procedures for a 
second round of SSP may soon have to be formulated in order to encourage 
and regulate the outright sale of premises after the renting contracts expire and 
property rights of premises are clarified. 
In order to ensure truly brisk SSP, some countries deliberately avoided the 
application of very detailed, intricate regulations. Policy makers in the CSFR, 
for instance, were much in favour of having only a skeleton of laws and well 
specified institutions to carry out the SSP. Polish regulation was also very loose 
and simple, and also reflected a full trust in the initiatives of local authorities. 
The favourable effects of a quick privatisation process can easily be elimi-
nated by tardy privatisation of monopolised wholesale trade and/or upstream 
suppliers. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland each tried to compensate for 
the delay in this area by effectively deregulating entry to these markets and 
liberalising imports. It remains to be seen how the Russian private sector can 
survive without comparable support from trade deregulation and inflow of 
imports. 
Notes 
* The authors wish to thank all the participants of the workshop for their valuable 
contributions and those leading policy makers and scholars who took time from 
their extremely busy schedules to meet with us and inform us about the unique 
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characteristics regarding SSP in their country. Other contributions notwithstanding, 
views or opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent those of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis or of its National Member Organisations. Any omissions or errors remain 
those of the authors. 
1. The starting price refers to the price which the auctioneer first suggests. 
2. Commercialisation refers to an enterprise achieving the status of being financially 
and managerially independent. This definition, used by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), also best corresponds to the meaning of the term in Russian. 
3. One must register to become a legal entity in Russia, otherwise one is considered a 
physical entity. The procedure is fairly complicated and time consuming. 
4. This city had been more commonly known as Gorky in the past. During the 
transition, it regained its historical name. According to the old Russian tradition, 
people often refer to it as Nizhny. 
5. Industrial ministries and large state enterprises directly own almost 100% of retail 
trade and consumer services in certain areas, such as oil extracting and coal mining 
regions, metallurgy, and nuclear energy centres. These ministries and enterprises 
were required to sell off their free-access retail shops and service units by the end of 
1992. The only exceptions are the shops located at oil wells, gold mines, and other· 
very inaccessible locations. 
6. The binding conditions include one or (rarely) more of the following three: 
(I) presen'ation of the former type of business, 
(2) perpetuation of the employment of the persons previously working at the outlet 
or enterprise, and. 
(3) obligation to invest. 
Such a contest is arranged primarily in rural areas and small cities, where the profile 
of the retail outlet is important for the population. The only participants allowed to 
bid are employees of the enterprise to be sold and residents (physical entities) living 
in the vicinity. 
7. The only participants permitted to enter such a contest are those who are ready to 
provide necessary financial injections. The winner might not be the highest bidder, 
but the one who best satisfies the criteria of the competition. 
8. The status of citizens from other Republics of the former Soviet Union remains 
unclear; in most cases, they are allowed to participate by default. 
9. Again, the status of the residents of former Soviet Republics remains unclear. In 
small cities and in rural areas, these 'foreign' residents normally find it extremely 
difficult to bid owing to the obvious social and political constraints. However, 
organisations from former Republics of the USSR have widespread operations, for 
example, in the Moscow property market. 
IO. The network consisted of approximately 8000 retail shops: 4500 food, 3000 non-
food, and the rest large department stores and mixed shops. 
I I. See M tiller (1991 ). 
12. According to a new law, introduced on 29 August 1992, tenants of these 4700 
outlets will have a 45-day period to apply for the purchase of the shop they 
currently rent. They will have the opportunity to buy it without auction at the book 
value of the premises or at the starting price of a fictitious auction. 
13. Privatisation of wholesale companies has started; they will be privatised outside the 
framework of SSP. 
14. The source of this information, as of many other aspects of SSP in Hungary 
summarised above, is Pal6cz ( 1992). 
15. Quoted by Tamowicz et al. ( 1992). In compiling this summary of Polish SSP we 
have relied heavily on this remarkable study. 
16. For example, in Novosibirsk oblast' revenue from SSP has reached an amazing 300 
million rubles, while in Omsk ob/as/' not a single ruble has come in yet from 
privatisation. 
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17. There is even open opposition to reform from local authorities in places like 
Voronezh and Kursk. 
18. Even in Nizhny, the pioneer in small scale privatisation, there is a conflict between 
local authorities and GAZ-the giant Volga car factory-with respect to this issue. 
The car producer, with all its auxiliary operations, possesses more economic clout 
than all the city's other enterprises together, including those under municipal 
authority. 
19. Following the traditional and conventional communist/socialist principle, each 
employee received an equal share in an operation, regardless of fairness or effort. 
Not only has this provided plenty of incentive to 'stroll along' as a free rider, but the 
employees must now be unanimous in a bid to sell their outlet. No individual can 
sell his or her share. In only 52 cases so far did employees actually agree to sell to a 
single entrepreneur-a very small percentage of the total number of shops priva-
tised by transfer to employees. 
20. In Nizhny, for example, on 4 April 1992, 22 outlets were sold for between 3 million 
and 5 million rubles each, and 80 bidders participated. At another auction in late 
May, 10 outlets were auctioned to only 20 bidders, and prices were around I 
million rubles apiece. 
21. There are already precedents of this kind in Novosibirsk, Omsk and Volgograd. 
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